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ε-NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
WITH MEAN-FIELD INTERACTION AND CONTROLLED JUMPS
CHIARA BENAZZOLI, LUCIANO CAMPI, AND LUCA DI PERSIO
Abstract. We consider a symmetric n-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with
controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes
some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of their own private state pro-
cess. We consider the corresponding limiting mean-field game and, under the assumption that
the latter admits a regular Markovian solution, we prove that an approximate Nash equilibrium
for the n-player game can be constructed for n large enough, and provide the rate of convergence.
This extends to a class of games with controlled jumps classical results in mean-field game lit-
erature. This paper complements our previous work [2], where in particular the existence of a
mean-field game solution was investigated.
Keywords and phrases: stochastic differential games, mean-field games, Nash equilibrium, Pois-
son process, jump measures.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a symmetric nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled
jumps, where the interaction among the players is of mean-field type. Our goal is to extend to
this setting classical results on constructing approximate Nash equilibrium, for a large number of
players, using the mean-field game approach.
Mean-field games (MFGs, henceforth) are optimization problems that were simultaneously in-
troduced by Lasry and Lions in [17, 18, 19] and by Huang and co-authors in [14]. They have to
be understood as an approximation of large population symmetric stochastic differential games,
whose players interact via the empirical law of their private states. According to such an approach,
when the number of players, n, is large enough, a solution of the limit MFG can be used to provide
a nearly Nash equilibria for the corresponding n-player games; see, e.g., [14], [16], [4], [5], [7] as
well as the recent book [3]. This approximation result is even more relevant as computing Nash
equilibria in n-player games with n very large is usually not feasible even numerically due to the
curse of dimensionality. Moreover, MFGs represent a very flexible framework for applications in
various areas including but not limited to finance, economics and crowd dynamics (see [12, 3] for
a good sample of applications), which partly explain the increasing literature on the subject.
The n-player game we consider can be shortly described as follows. Consider the following
dynamics for the private state, X i, of player i = 1, . . . , n:
(1) dX i,nt = b(t,X
i,n
t , µ
n
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i,n
t )dW
i
t + β(µ
n
t−, γ
i
t)dN˜
i
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
where γi is the control of player i, µnt = (1/n)
∑n
j=1 δXj,nt
is the empirical distribution of the vector
(X1,nt , . . . , X
n,n
t ) of the private states of all players, (W
1, . . . ,Wn) is an n-dimensional Brownian
motion and (N˜1, . . . , N˜n) is an n-dimensional (compensated) jump process. The goal of each player
i is minimizing some objective functional, given by
(2) E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i,nt , µ
n
t , γ
i
t)dt+ g(X
i,n
T , µ
n
T )
]
,
over her/his controls, for some running cost f and some final cost g. In a nutshell we are dealing
with a symmetric stochastic differential game, where the agents interact through the empirical
distribution of their private states, entering in both the drift and the jump component.
According to mean-field game theory, we expect that as the number of players gets larger and
larger, the n-player game just described tends in some sense to the following MFG with controlled
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jumps, which has been the object of our previous paper [2], where we focused on the existence of
solutions for the limit MFG and we gave sufficient conditions granting the existence of a Markovian
solution. Moreover, in [2] we also provided an application to an illiquid interbank model where
everything can be computed explicitly.
In the limiting MFG, Y = Y γ denotes a state variable following the dynamics
(3) dYt = b(t, Yt, µt)dt+ σ(t, Yt)dWt + β(µt−, γt)dN˜t, t ∈ [0, T ],
where (µt)t∈[0,T ] is a deterministic right-continuous with left limit (henceforth càdlàg) measure
flow, i.e. any µt belongs to the space of all probability measures on the real line P(R) equipped
with the topology of the weak convergence, γt represents a control process, taking values in a fixed
action space A, W is a standard Brownian motion and N is some (compensated) jump process.
Moreover, we assume that W and N are independent. The aim is to find a control γˆ solving the
following minimization problem
(4) inf
γ
E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Yt, µt, γt)dt+ g(YT , µT )
]
,
over all control processes γ as above and such that the so-called mean-field condition is fulfilled:
the measure flow µ has to be equal to the law of the optimally controlled dynamic Ŷ = Y γˆ at each
time, that is µt = L(Ŷt) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Our main contribution is that any solution to the latter, provided it is Markovian and Lipschitz
continuous in the state variable, provides a good approximation of some Nash equilibrium in the
n-player game. More precisely, let γˆ(t, Yt−) be a Markovian MFG solution with γˆ(t, x) Lipschitz
continuous in x, hence the strategy profile (γˆ(t,X1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t,X
n,n
t− )), for t ∈ [0, T ], is an εn-Nash
equilibrium in the n-player game, where εn → 0 as n → ∞. This result extends to our jump
setting classical results that have been proven for continuous paths state variables as in, e.g., [4, 5,
7]. Notice that our model is one-dimensional only for the sake of simplicity, extending our results
to a multi-dimensional state variable X is straightforward.
We conclude the introduction with a brief overview on MFG for jump processes. While the
uncontrolled counter-part of MFG, that is particle systems and propagation of chaos for jump
processes, has been thoroughly studied in the probabilistic literature (see, e.g., [11, 15] and the
very recent preprint [1]), MFGs with jumps have not attracted much attention so far. Indeed,
most of the existing literature focuses on non-linear dynamics with continuous paths, with the
exception of few papers such as [10, 13, 16], and the more recent [8]. The paper [10] studies MFGs
in continuous-time with finitely many states, while [13] deals with stochastic control of McKean-
Vlasov type (see [6] for a comparison between MFG and McKean-Vlasov control), and [16] uses
methods based on potential theory and nonlinear Markov processes. The latter [8] presents a new
probabilistic approach based on jump processes used to get results on MFG with finitely many
states.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the n-player game, the corresponding
MFG and give all the relevant assumptions on the initial data and the coefficients. Section 3
contains the statement and the proof of the main theorem of this paper, establishing that under
suitable assumptions a Markovian MFG solution can be used to construct an approximate Nash
equilibrium for the n-player game with n sufficiently large.
2. A symmetric n-player game with interaction of mean-field type
In this section we give a precise description of the n-player game we are interested in, together
with the corresponding MFG. Moreover we set the main assumptions and prove some preliminary
a-priori estimates on the state variables.
2.1. The n-player game Gn with mean-field interaction. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) be a fil-
tered probability space satisfying the usual conditions and supporting n independent Brownian
motions W i and n independent Poisson processes N i with a time-dependent intensity λ(t), for
i = 1, . . . , n. Let X i,n be the unique strong solutions to the following SDEs
(5)
dX i,nt (γ) = b(t,X
i,n
t , µ
n
t )dt+ σ(t,X
i,n
t )dW
i
t + β(µ
n
t−, γ
i
t)dN˜
i
t ,
X i,n0 = ξ
i,
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where the initial values ξi, i = 1, . . . , n, are independent real-valued random variables, all dis-
tributed according to the same distribution χ. Here, µn denotes the empirical distribution of the
system Xn = (X1,n, . . . , Xn,n) at time t, which is defined as
(6) µnt = µ
n
t (γ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δXi,nt (γ)
,
where δ· is the Dirac measure.
Each player i chooses his/her control γi, also called strategy of Player i, which takes values in
the control space A. A is assumed to be a compact, convex set in R. To be admissible, a control γi
has to be a predictable process. The set of all the admissible strategies will be denoted by G and
A∞ will denote supa∈A |a|, which is finite by compactness of A. An admissible strategy profile γ
for the game Gn, also called simply an admissible strategy, is an n-tuple (γ
1, . . . , γn) of admissible
controls γi ∈ G for all i = 1, . . . , n, i.e. γ ∈ Gn, where γi represents the action chosen by Player
i. Assumptions guaranteeing the existence of a unique strong solution to the SDEs above will be
given later.
For Player i, the expected outcome of the game Gn according to the strategy profile γ =
(γ1, . . . , γn) is defined by
(7) J i,n(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i,nt (γ), µ
n
t (γ), γ
i
t)dt+ g(X
i,n
T (γ), µ
n
T (γ))
]
.
We assume that the functional J i,n represents a cost for the agent and that all the players are ra-
tional. Therefore, the aim of each player in the game is to minimize J i,n(γ) over his/her admissible
strategies G.
We write X i,n(γ) and J i,n(γ) to stress that the dynamics of the state and the expected cost of
game Gn of Player i depend not only on his/her control γ
i but also on the decision rule of the other
players. The interaction between the players is of mean-field type: the dynamics of each player
private state and his/her costs depend on the other players’ states only through their distribution.
Therefore the cost functions and the private state dynamics for each player i are invariant under
a permutation of the other players’ identities, and this provides symmetry to the game Gn.
Notation. Given an admissible strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Gn and an admissible strategy
η ∈ G, (η, γ−i) denotes a further admissible strategy where Player i deviates from γ by playing η,
whereas all the other players continue playing γj , j 6= i, i.e.
(η, γ−i) = (γ
1, . . . , γi−1, η, γi+1, . . . , γn) .
Our aim is to find an approximate Nash equilibrium for the n-player game Gn.
Definition 1. For a given ε ≥ 0, an admissible strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Gn is an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the n-player game Gn if for each i = 1, . . . , n and for any admissible strategy η ∈ G
the following inequality is satisfied
(8) J i,n(η, γ−i) ≥ J i,n(γ)− ε .
A strategy γ is a Nash equilibrium of the n-player game Gn if it is a 0-Nash equilibrium, that is
an ε-Nash equilibrium with ε = 0.
In other words, a strategy profile (γ1, . . . , γn) is an ε-Nash equilibrium if for each player in
the game an unilateral change of his/her strategy when the others remain unchanged provides a
maximum saving of ε.
We now introduce a mean-field game, which represents the previous game Gn when the number
of players n grows to infinity.
2.2. The associated mean-field game G∞ and main assumptions. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P )
be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions and supporting a Brownian motion
W and a Poisson process N with a time-dependent intensity function λ(t). Let Y be the unique
strong solution to
(9)
dYt(γ) = b(t, Yt, µt)dt+ σ(t, Yt)dWt + β(µt−, γt)dN˜t
Y0 = ξ ∼ χ
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where µ is a càdlàg flow of probability measures, µ : [0, T ]→ P(R), with µ(0−) = δ0. Assumptions
granting the existence of a unique strong solution to the SDE above will be given shortly. The
expected outcome of the game for playing strategy γ is defined by
(10) J(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Yt(γ), µt, γt)dt+ g(YT (γ), µT )
]
.
A mean-field game solution for G∞ is an admissible process γˆ ∈ G which is optimal, i.e. γˆ ∈
argminγ∈G J(γ), and satisfies the mean-field condition µt = L(Yt) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. A mean-field
solution γˆ of G∞ is said to be Markovian if γˆt = γˆ(t, Yt−) where γˆ is a measurable function.
For the games to be well-defined and to find an approximate Nash equilibrium for the n player
game Gn we have to require some integrability of the initial conditions of the state processes as
well as some regularity on the functions
b : [0, T ]× R× P(R)→ R, σ : [0, T ]× R→ R, β : P(R)×A→ R ,
λ : [0, T ]→ R+, f : [0, T ]× R× P(R)×A→ R, g : R× P(R)→ R ,
where R+ denotes the set of all positive real numbers.
Assumption 1. (1) The initial distribution χ belongs to Pq(R) for some q > 2, q 6= 4.
(2) b is a Lipschitz function both in x and m, σ is Lipschitz in x, and λ is Lipschitz in γ and
µ. Namely, there exist positive constants Lb, Lσ and Lβ such that
|b(t, x, µ)− b(t, y, ν)| ≤ Lb |x− y|+ LbdW,2(µ, ν) ∀x, y, µ, ν ∈ P2(R) , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] ,
|σ(t, x) − σ(t, y)| ≤ Lσ |x− y| ∀x, y ∈ R , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] ,
|β(µ, γ)− β(ν, η)| ≤ LβdW,2(µ, ν) + Lβ |γ − η| ∀µ, ν ∈ P2(R) , ∀γ, η ∈ A .
Without loss of generality, we can assume Lb = Lσ = Lβ = L.
Moreover, b, σ, β and λ are bounded, i.e. there exists a positive constant M satisfying
‖b‖
∞
+ ‖σ‖
∞
+ ‖β‖
∞
+ ‖λ‖
∞
≤M .
(3) f and g are Lipschitz functions in both x and m, i.e. there exist two positive constants
Lf , Lg such that
|f(t, x, µ, γ)− f(t, y, ν, γ)| ≤ Lf |x− y|+ LfdW,2(µ, ν) ∀x, y, µ, ν ∈ P2(R) , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] , ∀γ ∈ A
|g(x, µ)− g(y, ν)| ≤ Lg |x− y|+ LgdW,2(µ, ν) ∀x, y, µ, ν ∈ P2(R) .
As before, we can assume Lf = Lg = L.
Here dW,2 stands for the squared Wasserstein distance, while ‖ ·‖∞ denotes the sup-norm. From
now on, to simplify the notation, we write P(R) for P2(R) and dW for dW,2.
Note that by standard results, Assumption 1(1-2) ensures that equations (5) and (9) admit a
unique strong solution. The assumption q 6= 4 guarantees the applicability of [9, Theorem 1] to
obtain the rate of convergence (see our Remark 2 for details).
2.3. L2-estimates for the state processes and the empirical distribution process in Gn.
The two following lemmas provide estimates for the second moment of the process Xn (as in (5))
and for the corresponding empirical measure flow µn. The proofs are rather standard, we include
all the details for reader’s convenience.
Lemma 2.1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, for each admissible strategy γ ∈ Gn the related
controlled processes X i,n(γ) for i = 1, . . . , n, solving (5), satisfy
(11) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X i,nt |2
]
≤ Cˆ(χ, T, ‖b‖
∞
, ‖σ‖
∞
, ‖β‖
∞
, ‖λ‖
∞
) ,
where the constant Cˆ is independent of n and γ.
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Proof. There exists a constant C such that∣∣∣X i,nt ∣∣∣2 ≤ C |ξi|2 + C ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
b(s,X i,ns , µ
n
s )ds
∣∣∣∣2
+C
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
σ(s,X i,ns )dW
i
s
∣∣∣∣2 + C ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
β(µns−, γ
i
s)dN˜
i
s
∣∣∣∣2 .
Applying Jensen’s and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s inequalities, it follows that for a constant C
(which may change from line to line)
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣X i,nt ∣∣∣2
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi|2
]
+ CtE
[∫ t
0
sup
u∈[0,s]
∣∣b(s,X i,ns , µns )∣∣2 ds
]
+CE
[∫ t
0
σ(s,X i,ns )
2ds
]
+ CE
[∫ t
0
β(µns−, γ
i
s)
2λ(s)ds
]
≤ C(χ) + C ‖b‖2
∞
t2 + C ‖σ‖2
∞
t+ C ‖β‖2
∞
‖λ‖
∞
t
≤ Cˆ(χ, T, ‖b‖
∞
, ‖σ‖
∞
, ‖β‖
∞
, ‖λ‖
∞
),
where we have used Assumption 1(2) for the second inequality. 
Lemma 2.2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, for each n ≥ 1 and for each admissible strategy
γ ∈ Gn, there exists a constant Cˆ independent of n and γ such that
(12) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
dW (µ
n
t , δ0)
2
]
≤ Cˆ(χ, T, ‖b‖
∞
, ‖σ‖
∞
, ‖β‖
∞
, ‖λ‖
∞
).
Proof. We show that the constant Cˆ given in Lemma 2.1 provides the required bound. Indeed,
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
dW (µ
n
t , δ0)
2
]
≤ E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣X i,nt ∣∣∣2
]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣X i,nt ∣∣∣2
]
≤ Cˆ . 
3. Markovian ε-Nash equilibrium
This section presents the main result of this paper. Namely, we show how to construct approx-
imate equilibria for the n-player game Gn under the assumption that the mean-field game G∞
admits a Markovian solution. Therefore, consider the case when γˆ = γˆ(t, Yt−) is a Markovian
mean-field game solutions of G∞. Sufficient conditions ensuring the existence of Markovian mean-
field game solution, together with an application to an illiquid interbank model, is given in our
previous paper [2].
Consider the game Gn, where each agent i plays strategy γˆ = γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− ), i.e. each player follows
the optimal strategy function (t, x) 7→ γˆ(t, x) evaluated at the left-limit of his/her own state process
Xˆ i,nt− . The n-tuple Xˆ
n = (Xˆ1,n, . . . , Xˆn,n) is defined as solution the following system
(13)
dXˆ i,nt = b(t, Xˆ
i,n
t , µ
n
t )dt+ σ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t )dW
i
t + β(µ
n
t−, γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− ))dN˜
i
t ,
Xˆ i,n0 = ξ
i .
For each player the strategy γˆ(t, Xˆ i,nt− ) is admissible, i.e (γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− ))t∈[0,T ] ∈ G, being γˆ a (Borel)-
measurable function by construction and X i,nt− a predictable process as solution of the stochastic
differential equation (13).
All the results of this section are proved under the following standing assumption on the limiting
mean-field game G∞:
Assumption 2. Assume that there exists a Markovian mean-field game solution γˆt = γˆ(t, Yt−)
for the game G∞, for some measurable function γˆ : [0, T ]×R→ A. Moreover, the function γˆ(t, x)
is Lipschitz continuous in the state variable x, i.e.
(14) |γˆ(t, x)− γˆ(t, y)| ≤ Cγˆ |x− y| ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀x, y ∈ R ,
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for some constant Cγˆ > 0.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be fulfilled. If Xˆn is the solution of the system (13),
the n-tuple (γˆ(t, Xˆ1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )) is an εn-Nash equilibrium for the n-player game Gn, with
εn = O
(
n−α/2
)→ 0 as n→∞, where α = min{ 12 , q−22 }.
Without loss of generality we can assume that Cγˆ = L as in Assumption 1.
Notation. From now on, the strategy profile (γˆ(t, Xˆ1,nt− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )), t ∈ [0, T ], will be shortly
denoted by γˆXˆ
n
. Observe that Xˆ is the solution of (5) under such a strategy γˆXˆ
n
.
It is worth noting that in the game Gn all the players are symmetric in their behaviour. Indeed,
all the SDEs defining their states (cf. equation (5)) and their payoff functions (cf. equation (7))
have the same form. For this reason in the following we will prove the main result Theorem 3.1
considering without loss of generality deviations of Player 1 only. Indeed the same arguments
would apply to every other player in the game.
In the proof of Theorem 3.1, we will focus on two different scenarios: the case when all the players
choose to play according to the optimal recipe suggested by G∞, i.e. they all play γˆ(t, Xˆ
i,n
t− ) as
explained above, and the case when Player 1 deviates by choosing a different strategy η ∈ G, i.e.
(η, γˆXˆ
n
−1 ) = ((ηt, γˆ(t, Xˆ
2,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )))t∈[0,T ] .
Notation. In what follows, strategy (η, γˆX
n
−1 ) will be simply denoted by η
γˆ and the solution of (5)
under this strategy will be denoted by X˜ i,n.
In the following we will also make use of the processes Y i,n (i = 1, . . . , n) and Y˜ 1,n, given as
solutions of
(15) dY i,nt (γˆ) = b(t, Y
i,n
t , µˆt)dt+ σ(t, Y
i,n
t )dW
i
t + β(µˆt−, γˆ(t, Y
i,n
t− ))dN˜
i
t , Y
i,n
0 = ξ
i
and of
(16) dY˜ 1,nt (η) = b(t, Y˜
1,n
t , µˆt)dt+ σ(t, Y˜
1,n
t )dW
1
t + β(µˆt−, ηt)dN˜
1
t , Y˜
1,n
0 = ξ
1
respectively, where µˆt is the law of the state process of the limiting game G∞ under the Markovian
MFG solution γˆ. Note that since for each i, the process Y i,n is defined as the dynamics of a
representative player in G∞, given in equation (9), and γˆ is by construction a Markovian MFG
solution, then L(Y i,nt ) = µˆt.
Remark 1. The definition of processes Y 1,n and Y˜ 1,n differs from the one of Xˆ i,n and X˜ i,n due
to the different measure considered in the stochastic differential equations. Indeed in (5), the
dynamics of X i,n is computed taking into account the associated empirical distribution of the
system Xn, i.e. µn as defined in equation (6), while the dynamics of Y i,n and Y˜ 1,n in (15) and
(16) are computed with respect to µˆ. This implies that Y i,n and Y˜ 1,n do no longer depend on the
other players’ choices (and in the following we will say that they do not depend on n, for short).
Remark 2. Consider the empirical distribution of the system Y n = (Y 1,n, . . . , Y n,n) at time t,
namely
µY,nt = µ
Y,n
t (γˆ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δY i,nt
.
As first step we show that, in expectation, µY,n converges towards µˆ with respect to dW as n→∞,
namely
(17) lim
n→∞
E
[
dW (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
2
]
= 0 .
Being Y i,nt independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution µˆt, [9, The-
orem 1] ensures that
E
[
dW (µˆt, µˆ
Y,n
t )
2
]
≤ C(q)M
2
q
q (µˆ)
(
1√
n
+
1
n
q−2
q
)
where C is a positive constant depending on q, and Mq is defined as Mq(µ) =
∫
R
|x|q µ(dx).
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Arguing as in the previous Lemma 2.1 but exploiting the stronger hypothesis on the initial
distribution χ ∈ Pq(R) with q > 2, one can prove that Y , solution to the SDE (15), satisfies
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yt|q
]
≤ Cˆ2(χ, T, ‖b‖∞ , ‖σ‖∞ , ‖β‖∞ , ‖λ‖∞) .
This implies that Mq(µˆ) is finite, and therefore
(18) dW (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
2 = O
(
n−α
)
where α = min
{
1
2 ,
q−2
q
}
and being q > 2, it holds that
(19) lim
n→∞
E
[
dW (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
2
]
= 0
uniformly in time.
Now, we want to show that the process Y i,n(γˆ) approximates Xˆ i,n as n grows to infinity, in
a sense that will be specified later. Note that being independent of n, the dynamics of Y i,n(γˆ)
is easier to study. In both the systems Xˆn and Y n, all n players choose the same strategy, or
more precisely the same strategy form, i.e. γˆ(t, Xˆ i,nt− ) and γˆ(t, Y
i,n
t− ). We stress once more that the
dynamics in Xˆ depend on the actual law of the system, while the evolution of the state processes
Y i,n depends on µˆ.
Proposition 3.2. Let Xˆ i,n and Y i,n be defined as in equation (13) and (15), respectively. Then
we have
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µˆt)
2
]
= O
(
n−α
)
,(20)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣∣X i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2] = O (n−α) .(21)
Proof. For each t ∈ [0, T ]
∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2 ≤ 3(∫ t
0
(
b(s, Xˆ i,ns , µ
n
s )− b(s, Y i,ns , µˆs)
)
ds
)2
+ 3
(∫ t
0
(
σ(s, Xˆ i,ns )− σ(s, Y i,ns )
)
dW is
)2
+ 3
(∫ t
0
(
β(µns−, γˆ(s, Xˆ
i,n
s− ))− β(µˆs−, γˆ(s, Y i,ns− ))
)
dN˜ is
)2
.
Then,
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 3tE [∫ t
0
∣∣∣b(s, Xˆ i,ns , µns )− b(s, Y i,ns , µˆs)∣∣∣2 ds]
+3E
[∫ t
0
∣∣∣σ(s, Xˆ i,ns )− σ(s, Y i,ns )∣∣∣2 ds]
+3E
[∫ t
0
(
β(µns , γˆ(s, Xˆ
i,n
s ))− β(µˆs, γˆ(s, Y i,ns ))
)2
λ(s) ds
]
.
Using the Lipschitz continuity of functions b, σ and β, given by Assumption 1(2), and of γˆ(·, x),
as explained in equation (14), as well as the finiteness of E[supt∈[0,T ] dW (µ
n
t , δ0)
2], as in (12), we
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obtain
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 6tL2 ∫ t
0
(
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2] + E [dW (µns , µˆs)2]) ds
+3L2
∫ t
0
E
[
dW (µ
n
s , µˆs)
2
]
ds
+6L2 ‖λ‖
∞
∫ t
0
(
E
[
dW (µ
n
s , µˆs)
2
]
+ E
[∣∣∣γˆ(s, Xˆ i,ns )− γˆ(s, Y i,ns )∣∣∣2]) ds
≤ C˜(T, L,M)
∫ t
0
(
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [dW (µns , µˆs)2]) ds,(22)
for a suitable constant C˜. Moreover, by previous inequality (22), we get
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ
Y,n
t )
2
]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ C˜
n
n∑
i=1
∫ t
0
(
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [dW (µns , µˆs)2]) ds .
Then, it holds that
(23)
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µˆt)
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ 2E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ
Y,n
t )
2
]
+ 2E
[
dW (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ 2E
[
dW (µˆt, µ
Y,n
t )
2
]
+ 2C˜
∫ t
0
(
E
[
dW (µ
n
s , µˆs)
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]
)
ds .
Therefore, by equation (19) and Remark 2, we have
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µˆt)
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ O (n−α)+ 2C˜ ∫ t
0
(
E
[
dW (µ
n
s , µˆs)
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2]
)
ds,
which implies equations (20) and (21). 
In the previous estimates, we have considered the case when all the n players are choosing the
same strategy γˆ. We now investigate what happen to the players’ dynamics when Player 1 deviates
from the strategy profile γˆXˆ
n
by playing some other strategy η ∈ G. Note that in this case the
dynamics of each player in Gn is given by the solution to (5) under the strategy η
γˆ , i.e. X˜ i,n.
Proposition 3.3. Let Xˆ and X˜ be the solutions of the system (5), when the strategy profile is
given by γˆXˆ
n
and by ηγˆ, respectively. We denote by µn and µ˜n the empirical distribution of the
two systems. Then,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
2
]
= O
(
n−1
)
.
Moreover, considering Y˜ 1,n defined in equation (16), it holds that
(24) sup
t∈[0,T ], η∈G
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] = O (n−α) .
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Proof. Firstly, we consider Player 1. By Lemma 2.1, the Lipschitz condition on b, σ and β, and
the boundedness of function λ given by Assumption 1(2) imply
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,nt − X˜1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 3tL2 ∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,ns − X˜1,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [dW (µns , µ˜ns )2] ds+ 3L2 ∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,ns − X˜1,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
+ 3E
[∫ t
0
(
LdW (µ
n
s , µ˜
n
s ) + L
∣∣∣γˆ(s, Xˆ1,ns )− η∣∣∣)2 λ(s) ds]
≤ 12L2CˆT (2T + 2M + 1) + 12L2A2
∞
MT =: C1,
where the constant Cˆ, given as in equation (11), is independent of n and then so is C1. Furthermore,
by definition C1 does not depend on η either.
On the other hand, the other players for i = 2, . . . , n play the strategy γˆ(t,X i,nt− ) in both cases,
then, to find an estimate for E[|Xˆ i,nt − X˜ i,nt |2] we can argue as in (22). Finally, following the same
idea as to obtain (23), we have that
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
2
] ≤ 1
n
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,nt − X˜1,nt ∣∣∣2]+ 1n
n∑
i=2
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − X˜ i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ C1
n
+
C˜
n
n∑
i=2
∫ t
0
(
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,ns − X˜1,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [dW (µns , µ˜ns )2]) ds
and therefore
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=2
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − X˜ i,nt ∣∣∣2]
≤ C1
n
+
2C˜
n
n∑
i=2
∫ t
0
(
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ1,ns − X˜1,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [dW (µns , µ˜ns )2]) ds .
Finally, applying again Gronwall’s lemma, it is found that
(25) E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i=2
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,nt − X˜ i,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 1nK1(T, L,A∞, C1) ,
with K1 independent of n, t and η. Therefore
sup
t∈[0,T ] η∈G
E
[
dW (µ
n
t , µ˜
n
t )
2
]
= O
(
n−1
)
.
Lastly, arguing as in the proof of Proposition 3.2, by considering Y˜ 1,n as defined in (16) we have
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ 3(2t+ 1)L2 ∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣Xˆ i,ns − Y i,ns ∣∣∣2] ds
+ 3L2(2t+ ‖λ‖
∞
)
∫ t
0
E
[
dW (µ
n
s , µˆs)
2
]
ds
≤ K˜(T, L,M)
∫ t
0
(
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,ns − Y˜ 1,ns ∣∣∣2]+ E [dW (µns , µˆs)2]) ds,
so that
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ K˜(T, L,M)∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,ns − Y˜ 1,ns ∣∣∣2] ds+ K˜(T, L,M)O (n−α) .
Hence Gronwall’s lemma implies
(26) E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] ≤ K¯(T, L,M)O (n−α) ,
for a suitable constant K¯ independent of n and t, and therefore
sup
t∈[0,T ], η∈G
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣2] = O (n−α) .

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Remark 3. It is crucial here and in what follows that the constants K1 and K¯ appearing in (25)
and (26) do not depend on how Player 1 deviates from the strategy profile γˆXˆ
n
.
In order to prove Theorem 3.1, we will make use of the following two operators: J˜n : G
n → R
and J˜ : G→ R, defined by
(27) J˜n(γ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X1,nt (γ), µˆt, γ
1
t ) dt+ g(X
1,n
T (γ), µˆT )
]
and
(28) J˜(η) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y 1,nt , µˆt, ηt) dt+ g(Y
1,n
T , µˆT )
]
respectively, where X1,n(γ) and Y 1,n(η) are given as in (5) and (16). It is worth observing that J˜
does not depend on the number of players in the game n. Indeed, Y 1,n follows the dynamics of a
representative player in the mean-field game G∞, and therefore, J˜ is exactly the expected cost of
the strategy η in G∞ with respect the flow of measures µˆ, as given in equation (10). Therefore,
since γˆ(t, Y 1,nt ) is by construction one of the minimizing strategies, i.e. γˆ ∈ argminγ∈G J(γ), we
have that
(29) J˜(γˆ(t, Y 1,nt− )) ≤ J˜(η) for all η ∈ G and t ∈ [0, T ] .
As first step, we show that the value of Player 1 in the game Gn, when he/she deviates from
the candidate Nash equilibrium γˆn to a different admissible strategy η ∈ G, that is J1,n(ηγˆ) given
in equation (7), can be approximated (when n is large) with J˜n(η
γˆ), that is the expected cost
computed under the same strategy profile ηγˆ , but evaluated with respect to the mean measure mˆ.
Proposition 3.4. Let (t, x) 7→ γˆ(t, x) be as in Assumption 2. Consider the strategy profile
γˆXˆ
n
t = (γˆ(t, Xˆ
1,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )), t ∈ [0, T ],
and let η be an admissible strategy in G. Then
(30) sup
η∈G
∣∣∣J1,n(ηγˆ)− J˜n(ηγˆ)∣∣∣ = O (n−α2 ) .
Proof. By definition (27)-(28) and Assumption 1(3), the distance between the two operators J1,n
and J˜n can be bounded as follows.∣∣∣J1,n(ηγˆ)− J˜n(ηγˆ)∣∣∣ ≤ E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣f(t, X˜1,nt , µ˜nt , ηt)− f(t, X˜1,nt , µˆt, ηt)∣∣∣ dt
]
+ E
[∣∣∣g(X˜1,nT , µ˜nT )− g(X˜1,nT , µˆT )∣∣∣]
≤ L
∫ T
0
E [dW (µ˜
n
t , µˆt)] dt+ LE [dW (µ˜
n
T , µˆT )] .
Hence equation (30) follows from previous results in Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.3, since
E [dW (µ˜
n
t , µˆt)] ≤
(
E
[
dW (µ˜
n
t , µˆt)
2
]) 1
2 = O
(
n−
α
2
)
.

As second step, we approximate J˜n(η
γˆ) with J˜(η), that is the expected cost for playing η in the
mean-field game G∞.
Proposition 3.5. Let (t, x) 7→ γˆ(t, x) represent the Markovian structure of a mean-field game
solution of the game G∞, γˆ
Xˆn
t = (γˆ(t, Xˆ
1,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t, Xˆ
n,n
t− )), for t ∈ [0, T ], and let η ∈ G be an
admissible strategy. Then
(31) sup
η∈G
∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ = O (n−α2 ) .
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Proof. Arguing as in Proposition 3.4, we have that∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ ≤ E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣f(t, X˜1,nt , µˆt, ηt)− f(t, Y˜ 1,nt , µˆt, ηt)∣∣∣ dt
]
+ E
[∣∣∣g(X˜1,nT , µˆT )− g(Y˜ 1,nT , µˆT )∣∣∣]
≤ L
∫ T
0
E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt − Y˜ 1,nt ∣∣∣] dt+ LE [∣∣∣X˜1,nT − Y˜ 1,nT ∣∣∣] .
Since by Proposition 3.3, E
[∣∣∣X˜1,nt (ηγˆ)− Y˜ 1,nt (η)∣∣∣] = O (n−α2 ), then
(32) sup
η∈G
∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ = O (n−α2 ) ,
as claimed. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Given an admissible strategy η ∈ G, let
ε1n = 4 sup
η∈G
∣∣∣J1,n(ηγˆ)− J˜n(ηγˆ)∣∣∣ , ε2n = 4 sup
η∈G
∣∣∣J˜n(ηγˆ)− J˜(η)∣∣∣ , εn = ε1n + ε2n.
Then
J1,n(ηγˆ) ≥ −εn
2
+ J˜(η) ≥ −εn
2
+ J˜(γˆ) ≥ −εn + J1,n(γˆ),
which gives (8) for Player 1. More in detail, the first and the third inequalities are guaranteed
by Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.5 respectively, whereas the second inequality is justified in
equation (29). The symmetry of the game Gn guarantees that (γˆ(t,X
1,n
t− ), . . . , γˆ(t,X
n,n
t− )), for
t ∈ [0, T ], is an ε-Nash equilibrium of it.
The rate of convergence, i.e. εn = O
(
n−
α
2
)
, is also granted by the previous approximations in
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5. 
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